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CASE COMMENTS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: APPORTIONMENT OF DEATH
BENEFITS BECAUSE OF ACCELERATION OF A PREEXISTING
NONDISABLING DISEASE
Tingle v. Board of County Commissioners, 214 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968)
Decedent-employee fell in an awkward position while attempting to turn
a valve on an air-conditioning system in the course of his normal employment,
and experienced a sharp pain in his chest. On the third day following the
accident, while performing his usual heavy work, he again experienced
severe chest pain and lost consciousness. Decedent was hospitalized that
evening and died of a coronary thrombosis the next day.1 Prior to his death,
the decedent had a preexisting but nondisabling heart disease, arteriosclerosis
of the coronary artery, which was unknown to him and his employer. The
decedent had no symptoms of heart disease nor was his performance at
work impaired in any way prior to the accident. 2 The Deputy Commissioner
of the Florida Industrial Commission denied the petition of decedent's wife
for compensation benefits, and this order was affirmed by the full commission.3
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the decedent's death
was causally related to the accident and remanded the case to the deputy
commissioner for appropriate compensation.4 The deputy found that the
accident accelerated decedent's death by ten years, and concluded that full
death benefits under Florida Statutes, section 440.16 (2),5 should be paid
since the period of acceleration exceeded the 350-week compensation period
prescribed for death benefits. The commission remanded the cause to the
deputy for redetermination on the basis of Hampton v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Co.,8 which held that death benefits should be apportioned between the
accelerating accident and the preexisting disease. Claimant sought to have
the commission's order reversed by the Florida supreme court, which HELD,
that when an industrial accident causes death to an employee having a preexisting nondisabling disease, compensation must be limited under Florida
Statutes, section 440.02 (19),7 to acceleration rather than full death benefits.
The court approved the commission's order and discharged the writ, in a
4-3 decision s
1.
2.
3.
4.

Tingle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1965).
214 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
Id.
Tingle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1965).
5. FLA. STAT. §440.16(2) (1967): "If death results from the accident within one year
thereafter .. . the employer shall pay . .. (2) Compensation . . . but such compensation
... shall not exceed a period of three hundred fifty weeks nor fifteen thousand dollars.. ."
6. 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
7. FLA. STAT. §440.02(19) (1967): "Where a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated
or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the
accident shall be compensable with respect to permanent disability or death."
8. 214 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
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The apportionment provisions of Florida Workmen's Compensation
Laws9 are not in accord with similar statutes in the vast majority of states,
where the general rule is that the employer takes the employee as he finds
him.1° If an employee in these states has a preexisting disease, there may still
be full recovery if the employment aggravates, accelerates, or combines with
the disease to produce death or disability. A common example of accelerating
the preexisting disease is heart failure caused by exertion,1" excitement, 12 or
other employment conditions." The majority of the state courts apply the
sine qua non rule, reasoning that a weak heart might have functioned
indefinitely but for these employment conditions.
Florida is one of only five states' 4 that provides by statutes for apportionment of compensation between the preexisting disease and the disability
attributable to the accident.1 5 Other states do not attempt to weigh the
relative contributions of the accident and the prior nondisabling disease 16 or
to consider the shortened life expectancy of the employee because of the
disease. Although the employee in these states might have died from the
disease anyway, the accident is deemed the cause of death for compensation
purposes if the accident hastens death. 1" "To hasten death is to cause it."''
Under the special apportionment provisions in the compensation laws of
the five aforementioned states, if a prior personal disability contributes to
the final disabling result, the injured worker faces the possibility of having
to bear a substantial portion of the final loss himself. The worker will receive
only that to which he is entitled for the injury itself. 9 The Florida supreme

9. FLA. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1967).
10. See, e.g., Green v. Al Green Enterprises, Inc., 73 N.J. Super. 132, 179 A.2d 151
(1962); Reynolds v. Ruidoso Racing Ass'n, Inc., 69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Wexler v. Lambrecht Foods, 64 N.J. Super. 489, 166 A.2d 576 (1960);
Shayewitz v. Ocean View Bake Shop, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 562, 211 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1961);
Akers & Van Hook Constr. Co. v. Beller, 356 P.2d 738 (Okla. 1960); Olson v. State Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 222 Ore. 407, 352 P.2d 1096 (1960).
12. See, e.g., Stehli v. Stehli, 62 N.J. App. 88, 162 A.2d 289 (1960); Micallef v. Harry
Krischer-Blanner Realty Co., 10 App. Div. 2d 743, 197 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1960).
13. See, e.g., Eason Oil Co. v. Kerns, 353 P.2d 471 (Okla. 1960); Frick v. School Dist.
of Pittsburgh, 167 Super. 431, 74 A.2d 659 (1950); Eslinger v. Miller Bros. Co., 203 Tenn.
688, 315 S.W.2d 261 (1958).
14. CAL. LABOR CODE §4664 (Deering 1964); FLA. STAT. §440.02(19) (1967); Ky. Rirv.
STAT. ANN. §342.005 (2) (1963); MISS. CODE ANN. §6998 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §65-05-15
(1967).
15. See, e.g., State Compensation Ins. Fund. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 56 Cal. 2d
681, 365 P.2d 415, 16 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1961); Scott v. Kerr, 156 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1963); Terry
v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).
16. See, e.g., Hughes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 138 So. 2d 881 (La. 1962); Speed v.
Kieckhefer Container Co., 134 So. 2d 76 (La. 1961); Heller v. Frahell Realty Corp., 12 App.
Div. 2d 549, 206 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1960).
17. See, e.g., Woodbury v. Frank B. Arata Fruit Co., 65 Idaho 227, 130 P.2d 870
(1942); Maryland-Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Jones, 222 Md. 54, 158 A.2d 621 (1960); Boyd
v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10 (1951).
18. Avignone Freres, Inc. v. Cardillo, 117 F.2d 385, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
19. See cases cited note 13 supra.
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court in conjunction with legislative enactment has tempered the harshness
of this statute by ruling that apportionment applies only to permanent
0
disability or death.2
The real question for these five state courts regarding apportionment,
however, concerns which kind of preexisting disabilities are apportionable.
The majority rule is that apportionable disability does not include a prior
nondisabling disease that contributes to the injury.21 In addition, the
majority hold that infirmities due to age are not apportionable if they are
nondisabling prior to the employment accident.2 2 The essential distinction
is between a preexisting disability that independently produces part or all of
the final injury and a preexisting condition that combines with or is acted
upon by the accident. Preexisting disability is normally defined as disability
in the sense of impairment of earning capacity. 23 The general rule is that
to be apportionable a disease must have been in some way disabling prior
25
to the accident.2 4 Florida does not follow this rule.
Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley26 and Hampton v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co. 2 7 reflect the old rule in Florida regarding the apportionment of
compensation in "heart" cases. Claimants in both cases suffered heart attacks
while working, and the court ruled that the injury was compensable only
if causally related to the accident and, if compensable, the recovery must be
apportioned. This rationale was followed by the court in several subsequent
28
cases.
In G & L Motor Corp. v. Taylor,29 a more recent "heart" case, the court
held that apportionment was not appropriate and that the claimant could
recover full compensation for his heart attack.

Although the claimant was

sixty years of age, the court appears to have been influenced by testimony
that it would be medically impossible to calculate the relative effects of the
claimant's preexisting heart disease and the accident.
20. Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1967); Evans v. Florida
Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967); F.A. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1967): "Compensation
for temporary disability and medical benefits provided by this chapter shall not be subject
to apportionment under this subsection." (emphasis added).
21. 2 A. LARSON, Tm LAw OF WoRxMEN's COMPENSATION §59.20, at 88.109-88.110 (1968):
"Nothing is better established in compensation law than the rule that, when industrial
injury precipitates disability from a latent prior condition, such as heart disease ...
the
entire disability is compensable... no attempt is made to weigh the relative contribution
of the accident and the pre-existing condition to the final disability or death. Apportionment does not apply in such cases, nor in any case in which the prior condition was
not a disability in the compensation sense."
22. See, e.g., Duprey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 219 Mass. 189, 106 N.E. 686 (1914); Furlong
v. Northwestern Casket Co., 190 Minn. 552, 252 N.W. 656 (1934).
23. A. LARsoN, supra note 21, §59.20, at 88.116.
24. A. LARSON, supra note 21, §59.20, at 88.118.
25. See, e.g., Victor Wine & Liquor Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962); Hampton
v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
26. 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
27. 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
28. See, e.g., Scott v. Kerr, 156 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1963); City of Boca Raton v. Sellers, 148

So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1962).
29.

182 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1966),
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In Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission,30 the next major case in this
area, the Florida supreme court ruled that apportionment was appropriate
only when the preexisting disease was either independently disabling at the
time of the accident or was producing disability through its normal progress
at the time an award was made.31 The court held that apportionment under
section 440.02 (19) was proper only when a preexisting disease independently
produced disability,32 and by dictum indicated that a preexisting disease
3
could not be held to produce a portion of the claimant's death..
In Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 34 the Florida supreme court held
that section 440.15 (5) (c) 35 of the compensation statutes, dealing with apportionment of successive injuries, was incompatible with the basic theory
of workmen's compensation, which is to reimburse injured employees for
losses due to industrial accidents. The court further held that section
440.02 (19) had parallel application with section 440.15 (5) (c). In its opinion
on rehearing, the court observed that the principle of apportionment is in
direct conflict with the maxim that the employer takes the employee as he
finds him. 36 The court pointed out, however, that there is a difference
between a preexisting disability and a preexisting condition, and that a
"latent predisposition to injury" is nonapportionable.3 7 The Evans and
Stephens cases have been followed in Florida in at least five subsequent

30. 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967).
31. Id. at 752-53: "[An] apportionment is proper only when and to the extent that the
pre-existing disease either, (I) was disabling at the time of the accident and continued
to be so at the time the award is made or (2) was producing no disability at the time
of the accident but through its normal progress is doing so at the time permanent disability is determined and an award is made.
"This ... is the only logical and fair interpretation which can be given the statute."
32. Id. at 754.
33. Id. at 753: "[W]hile it can be said that a pre-existing disease would have produced
a portion of claimant's disability regardless of the accident, it of course cannot be said that
it would have produced a portion of claimant's death."
34. 201 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1967).
35. FLA. STAT. §440.15 (5) (c) (1967): "The fact that an employee has suffered previous
disability or received compensation therefor shall not preclude him from benefits for a
later injury nor preclude benefits for death resulting therefrom; but in determining compensation for the later injury or death his average weekly wages shall be such sum as will
represent his earning capacity at the time of the later injury, provided, however, that an
employee who is suffering from a previous disability shall not receive compensation for
later injury in excess of the compensation allowed for such injury when considered by
itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability."
36. In Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748, 751 (Fla. 1967), the court stated:
"Since this maxim is a part of the basic philosophy of our workmen's compensation act, it
follows that the apportionment provisions should be construed so as to minimize their
inconsistency with it." Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 So. 2d 731, 742 (Fla.
1967).
37. Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 So. 731, 742 (Fla. 1967): "[There is a]
very real distinction between residual disability, which is apportionable, and residual
predisposition to re-injury, which is not. . . . [A] latent predisposition to injury, whether
resulting from disease or from an earlier injury, escapes the operation of the apportionment formula ......

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss5/8

4

Katz: Workmen's Compensation: Apportionment of Death Benefits because o
1969]

CASE COMMENTS

decisions38 The present decision is an abrupt departure from these rulings
and a reversion to the older Hampton39 rationale.
The court's decision in the instant case may be criticized on several
different grounds:
(1) It is exceedingly difficult in cases such as the principal case to
determine which portion of the decedent's death occurred as a result of
the accident and which as a result of the preexisting disease. Normally,
the most that could be said with any accuracy is that the decedent's
preexisting disease had some effect upon his subsequent death.
In the instant case, the deputy commissioner determined that the
decedent's accident hastened his death by ten years. Although not stated
in the facts, this estimation was probably based upon a combination of
medical testimony and actuarial tables. While both of these sources may
be substantially valid in a determination of the average, they often have
little relationship to the individual case. There does not seem to be
any alternative or additional means of determining the basis for apportionment in a particular case. It is questionable whether it is a valid
function of either the court or the commission to attempt an apportionment in a death case, for such a determination can at best be only an
educated guess. It is quite possible that the decedent in the principal
case would have lived a full life despite this accident.
(2) The court has ruled in the past that apportionment under
section 440.02 (19) was not appropriate when the employee suffered from
a prior nondisabling disease.40 The present court appears to be making
a different rule for death cases. It is ironical that had the decedent lived,
he would have been eligible for full compensation under the statute.
(3) There is a serious question regarding the present court's interpretation of "disability" under section 440.02 (19) since the decedent
was not in any way disabled prior to the accident and had fully performed his employment duties up to the time he was hospitalized.1
(4) The principal case is dearly contrary to the great body of workmen's compensation law in the rest of the United States.4 2 In addition,
this decision is in opposition to the Stephens and Evans rationale previously followed by the court. The court makes no real attempt to distinguish the principal case from Evans and relies instead upon a strict
construction of section 440.02 (19). The only clear difference between
the two cases lies in the fact that in the present case the injured
employee died, but in Evans he lived. This is not a rational distinction. 3
88. Tingle v. Board of County Comm'rs., 214 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1968).
39. Hampton v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
40. Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1967); Evans v. Florida
Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967).
41. FL.A. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1967), quoted note 20 supra.
42. See, e.g., Troup County v. Henderson, 104 Ga. App. 29, 121 S.E.2d 65 (1961); Price
v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 213 (La. 1963); Eckhaus v. Adeck Stores, Inc.,
11 N.Y.2d 862, 182 N.E.2d 287, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1962); Oviatt v. Oviatt Dairy, Inc., 119
N.W.2d 649 (S.D. 1963).
43. Under the rationale of the principal case a situation may easily arise where an
employee is killed by an employment accident and recovery is indiscriminately apportioned
because an autopsy discloses heart disease. If the employee should happen to survive the
accident and recover from his injuries, however, he would, under present compensation law
in Florida, be entitled to full compensation. This is dearly irrational, if for no other
reason than the fact that an employee who dies from an employment accident obviously
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The court does not mention either the Stephens or G & L Motor Corp.
decisions.
(5) The court's holding in the present case has confused the application of section 440.02 (19), for it now is extremely difficult to determine
what benefits an employee will recover from an accident that occurred
while he was suffering from a preexisting nondisabling disease. Further
cases of this nature will certainly come before the court, and it is now
difficult to predict results in this area.
The present holding is contrary to both the national weight of authority"4
and recent rulings of the Florida supreme court based on similar fact
situations. 45 In addition, the court's position on the apportionment of compensation in the instant case is logically inconsistent, both in relationship
to the Evans decision and in making a different rule for death cases under
section 440.02 (19).
46
Justice Ervin, in his dissenting opinion in the principal case, stated:
Inasmuch as there was no existing disability resulting from the normal
progress of the disease, the rationale of Evans indicates that as a matter
of law the resulting death was due to the acceleration or aggravation of
the preexisting disease by the accident, and apportionment is not
required.
This is clearly the more rational approach.
EVERETT H. WILCOX, JR.

HABEAS CORPUS: MAINTENANCE OF A CLASS APPLICATION
UNDER FEDERAL RULE 23
Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97 (M.D. Fla. 1968)
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida was
petitioned, to determine the propriety of a class action under rule 23,2
"loses" more than an employee who survives, and thus should be entitled to full compensation. In addition, the court's holding in the present case runs directly counter to the
Evans and Stephens decisions.
44. See cases cited note 42 supra.
45. Stephens v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 201 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1967); Evans v. Florida
Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967).
46. 214 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1967) (emphasis added).
1. Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1968): "CLASS ACTIONS (a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable under federal rule 81 (a)
(2) .3 Petitioner sought to represent the class of condemned prisoners awaiting execution in the state penitentiary at Raiford.4 These prisoners commonly questioned the validity of the Florida death penalty and certain
Florida court practices, including the exclusion of prospective jurors for
cause on the basis of their having scruples against capital punishment. 5 The
court, in accord with the mandate of rule 23 (c) (1), delayed a decision on
the merits of the petitioners' claim until the court could determine whether
a multi-party habeas corpus petition could properly be entertained. The
court HELD, that the petitioners would be allowed to proceed as a class in
accordance with rule 23.6 This decision represents the only instance where
a court has allowed the utilization of the class action provision under the
federal rules in a multi-party habeas corpus application.
This case presents two primary issues: (1) whether the civil rules are
applicable in habeas corpus proceedings and (2) if so, whether a class action
for habeas corpus under rule 23 may be maintained. Habeas corpus has
been traditionally recognized as a civil proceeding since it does not inquire
into the guilt or innocence of the petitioner but tests only the legality of his
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. (b) Class
Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites
of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions
by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or
varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action .. "
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (a) (2) (1968): "APPLICABILITY IN GENERAL (a) To What
Proceedings Applicable.... (2) These rules are applicable to proceedings for admission to
citizenship, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, to the extent that the practice in such
proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed
to the practice in civil actions...."
4. At the time the application was filed in the present case, none of the 50 prisoners
on death row were involved in any pending legal action. See Affidavit of Louie J. Wainwright, Director of Florida Division of Corrections, May 23, 1967, in Respondents Memorandum of Law, App., Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
5. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
6. 46 F.R.D. 97, 99 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
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detention.' The court cited Seals v. Wiman s as evidence of the Fifth Circuit's
adherence to the proposition that there is not a doctrinal objection to the
applicability of the civil rules in habeas corpus proceedings. The Seals
court stated: "habeas corpus is a civil proceeding governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure . .."9 The Seals espousement of the applicability
of the rules of civil procedure to habeas corpus proceedings is in accord with
rule 81 (a) (2), which provides that the civil rules are applicable to proceedings in habeas corpus to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is
not set forth in statutes of the United States and has previously conformed
to the practice in civil actions.
The applicability of the federal rules in habeas corpus proceedings under
rule 81 (a) (2) has been denied by other federal jurisdictions. In Wilson v.
Harris° the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an applicant
for a writ of habeas corpus does not have the right to propound written
interrogatories under rules 23 and 26 in aid of that application. The court
here did not absolutely deny the applicability of the civil rules but stated that
the second qualification of rule 81 (a) (2) had not been satisfied since the
applicant had failed to show that the right to submission of written interrogatories "had heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits
in equity."',,
The lack of controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit enunciating the
proposition stated in Seals, was probably the determinative factor in the
Wilson decision.
Recently, in Mitchell v. Schoonfield 2 a federal district court in Maryland passed upon a habeas corpus application by some fifty persons confined
in the city jail and stated in regard to the applicability of rule 23 through
rule 81 (a) (2) : "under rule 81 (a) (2), it is not at all clear whether Rule 23
is applicable in any respect to habeas corpus proceedings brought in the
Federal District Courts."' 3 The Mitchell court decided that petitioners'
application was premature because available state corrective remedies were
effective and were required to be exhausted before applying to the federal
courts for relief.
This is a case of first impression and supplies a precedent as to the
applicability of rule 23 under rule 81 (a) (2) in habeas corpus proceedings.
The first qualification under rule 81 (a) (2) that the civil rules are applicable
to the extent that practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes

7. E.g., Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556,
559-60 (1883); Note, Multi-Party Habeas Corpus, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1482, 1491 (1968).
8. 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962). See also Hunter v. Thomas, 173 F.2d 810, 812 (10th
Cir. 1949).
9. 304 F.2d 53, 64 (5th Cir. 1962).
10. 378 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Boddie v. Weakley 356 F.2d 242, 245
(4th Cir. 1966) (application of federal rule 56(e) denied in habeas corpus proceeding under
federal rule 81 (a)).
11. Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141, 143 n.2 (9th Cir. 1967).
12. 285 F. Supp. 728 (D. Md. 1968).
13. Id. at 729.
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of the United States is not violated by the present decision. There does not
exist a federal statute that could be construed to preclude multi-party
habeas corpus applications. Perhaps an argument could be made that since
the federal habeas corpus provisions 4 require that the application be signed
and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone
acting in his behalf, and since the reference is to person, singular, the writ
is not intended to issue in multi-party proceedings. Such an argument would
be of little merit, however, in light of the fact that joint habeas corpus
petitions have been entertained where the petitioners were convictd at common trial.1 5 The second qualification of rule 81 (a) (2), that the rules shall
apply to habeas corpus proceedings to the extent that such proceedings
"heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions," is satisfied by the
16
above mentioned joint applications of those convicted at common trial.
The court in the present case, having established that the civil rules are
applicable in habeas corpus actions, proceeded to examine the four prerequisites to the maintenance of a class action under federal rule 23 (a) :17
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impractical, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
In considering these prerequisites the court pointed out that there were in
excess of fifty prisoners in the class petitioners sought to represent, and
that fluctuations in the size of the class due to executive commutation,
pardon, or withdrawal of counsel for a prisoner individually represented
would make joinder of all members impracticable.18 The reference to joinder
in the first prerequisite undoubtedly refers to permissive joinder under rule
20 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under rule 20 (a), the existence
of a right to relief arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences is required as a prerequisite for permissive
joinder. The federal courts have frequently entertained joint habeas corpus
applications that presented the common claims of two or more petitioners
convicted at joint trial.- However, there is only one case in which a joint
petition was allowed to determine questions of law or fact common to
several prisoners convicted in separate trials.20 Whether a common factor
14. 28 U.S.C. §2242 (1968).
15. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 361 U.S. 375 (1960); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923); Note supra note 7, at 1497.
16. See, e.g., United States ex rel Poret v. Sigler, 361 U.S. 375 (1960); Moore v. Dempsey,

261 U.S. 86 (1923).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (1-3).
18. 46 F.R.D. 97, 98 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
19. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 361 U.S. 375 (1960); Moore v. Dempsey,

261 US. 86 (1923).
20. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 US. 371 (1879). In Siebold," five election judges convicted
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such as operation of a statute or court practice could suffice to provide the
requisite "same occurrence" is conjectural because it has been previously held
that a common occurrence or transaction requires something more than unrelated acts.2 1 It is doubtful that rule 20 could be applied in a situation
where, as in the present case, the petitioners were convicted for unrelated acts.
The court also found that the prerequisites under rule 23 (a) (2) and (3)
were fully met because the petitioners commonly attacked the validity of the
Florida death penalty and Florida juror exclusion practice in capital cases.
This provided questions of law common to the class and claims and defenses
of the representative parties that were typical of the claims and defenses of
the class. The court recognized that rule 23 (a) (4) was also satisfied since
it appeared that the interest of the representative and the other members
of the class coincided, thereby insuring that the interests of the class would
be adequately and fairly protected. 22 Since the lives of the representatives
depend upon successful application, it is apparent that they will pursue
their appeal diligently and that such diligence will benefit the entire class.
Having recognized that the four prerequisites to maintenance of a class
action under rule 23 (a) had been met, the court considered the additional
requirements imposed by rule 23 (b). Under this subsection, a class action
may be maintained if: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying
adjudications resulting in discriminatory treatment within the class or if
such adjudications would be dispositive of the interests of members not
parties to that adjudication; (2) the opponent of the class has refused to
act or has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) the
court finds that a class action would be superior to other means of adjudication because questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members. The court found that
subsection (3) had been satisfied, and a class action was superior to other
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims.
It also appears that the alternative criteria set forth under subsection (1)
were met by the facts in the present case. There is certainly a threat of
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the members of the class.
These adjudications would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class.23 This result would be especially possible in
Florida where petitioners, in exhausting available state remedies, are required
24
to apply for habeas corpus to the court in which they were sentenced.

separately of election violations were ordered by Chief Justice Waite to consolidate their
individual petitions into a single petition. In retrospect, since the petitioners had been
convicted for offenses committed during the same election and in violation of the same
statute, one might attribute the court's action to the presence of a common transaction or
occurrence.
21. See, e.g., King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (Ist Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 867 (1967).
22. 46 F.R.D. 97, 98 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
23. Fa. R. Civ. P., 23 (b) (1) (A).
24. FLA. R. Ciani. P., 1.850.
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Under rule 23 (b) (1) (B) a class action would be properly maintained in
cases similar to the present case since adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class would be dispositive of the interests of other class
member similarly situated but not a party to that adjudication. Stare decisis
is difficult to surmount, and an adverse decision on an individual's petition
could result in practical foreclosure of another prisoner's right to due process
since the excluded prisoner could be subject to the persuasive effect of that
decision without having been a participant in the determination of the
common issue.
The respondent in the present case directed the court's attention to the
case of Hill v. Nelson 25 for the proposition that a class action is not applicable
in habeas corpus proceedings.2 6 In Hill, petitioners sought to represent in an
application for habeas corpus a class comprised of all the condemned prisoners awaiting execution in California. The common issues in Hill involved
the contentions that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment and certain California court
practices, including exclusion for cause of jurors expressing scruples against
27
capital punishment, as being violative of due process of law.
The court in the instant case, considered Hill and distinguished the

respondent's proposition on the basis of the presiding judge's statement in
28
Hill that he could not say:

[T]hat a class action for a writ of habeas corpus could never under
any circumstances be maintained but. . . because of the procedural
problems inherent in this proceeding, use of such a class suit does
not appear the most practicable vehicle to determine the issues
presented.
The Hill court treated the applicants' petitions individually under the
discretionary power of the court to dispose of the matter as law and justice
require as provided by the federal habeas corpus statute. 29 This intimates
that the Hill court may have regarded petitioners' request for class relief
as a request for the court to proceed under its statutory authority to develop
procedures in habeas corpus. An inherent common law authority to develop
procedures for habeas corpus application has long been recognized and
remains intact except where precluded from operation by statute. 0
The present case involved a direct application of the federal rules in
a habeas corpus action. The court was not relying on common law or statutory authority in allowing the petitioners to proceed as a class but relied
25. 272 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
26. 46 F.R.D. 97, 99 )M.D. Fla. 1968).
27. 272 F. Supp. 790, 792 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
28. Id. at 794.
29, 28 U.S.C. §2243 (1964). The Hill court refused to allow the petitioners to proceed
as a class because of possible complexities arising from various uncommon claims. It is
submitted that such individual claims would not reduce the import of the common claims.
See Note, supra note 7, at 1488 n.44.
30. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1969], Art. 8
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

solely on rule 23, as made applicable through rule 81 (a). Under either
source of authority, an application of rule 23 would provide great flexibility
for the courts in habeas corpus proceedings.
Since a class action is a noted exception to the demand of due process
that a person cannot be bound without his day in court,3 1 the notice
requirement under rule 23 (c) (3) should be construed to require actual
notice to all class members. This construction is especially appropriate in
class actions involving convicts, centrally confined and located as in the
present case. This would insure against a class member seeking an individual
application alleging that he had not received adequate notice.
The present court recognized that allowing the petitioners to proceed
as a class "eliminates that problem of appointment of attorneys to serve
without fee for more than fifty prisoners." 32 It is a generally accepted premise
that an absolute right to appointed counsel does not exist for post conviction
relief.33 The present court intimated in the foregoing quotation that a
consideration had been made as to appointment of counsel for the individuals
involved. The court also recognized that the risk of prejudice to functionally
illiterate prisoners would also be avoided by utilization of the class action
proceedings.- These considerations are certainly in accord with the present
liberal attitude in regard to availability of federal forums to state prisoners
in habeas corpus proceedings. 35 The class action procedure under rule 23
does not provide for appointment of counsel to represent the class. In effect,
the proceeding greatly facilitates representation of indigents by private associations and individuals. While the right to appointed counsel for post
conviction relief is not absolute, its effects insuring due process are practically
obtainable through the maintenance of a class action under rule 23.
MICHAEL D. KATz

31. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
32. 46 F.R.D. 86, 99 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
33. See United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960). "Post conviction relief" refers to preparation of extraordinary writs subsequent to exhaustion of available appeals of right; it has been previously held by the present court that "jail house
lawyers" may assist fellow prisoners in preparation of writs and that prison regulations
forbidding such activity are invalid. See Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969); Coonts v.
Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. (M.D. Fla. 1968).
34. 46 F.R.D. 86, 99 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
35. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-35 (1963). See also McDonald v. Moore, 234 F. Supp.
1008 (M.D. Fla. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965) (affirmed as to
the exhaustion issue but reversed on the merits).
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